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What is the need for a careful analysis of the arms industry with all its suppliers, logistics, financiers, researchers and lobbyists? Is it not sufficient to know where the major manufacturers of weapons and war equipment are located in order to be able to attack them? Just as the Disarm Rheinmetall campaign, for example, has decided, at least in principle, to focus its opposition to the arms industry primarily via one of Germany’s largest arms companies, the Rheinmetall Group? Of course, it would be a great victory to successfully shatter the major arms corporations whose core business revolves around weapons and war materiel, but if one remains realistic for a moment, the barbed-wire-armored, camera-surveilled and security patrolled factory premises of companies like Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffai Wegmann, Heckler & Koch, DIEHL Defence, Airbus and Co. offer only a marginal scope for (precise) sabotage and attacks. Certainly, it is the producers of tanks, fighter planes, machine guns, missiles and bombs who are a particular thorn in the side of all of us, who most visibly produce the equipment used for murders, genocides and slaughters perpetrated elsewhere in the world, which always stirs up social protest, but only because the arms industry has halfway succeeded in hiding the rest of its structure, its logistics and its profiteers. We, as anti-militarists and anarchists, do not have to fall for this deception as well.

A careful analysis of the arms industry, revealing its networks, entanglements, suppliers, logistics, its research and lobbyists, and last but not least its financiers, can on the one hand show how closely intertwined technology and production are with war, and counter the myth that any (arms) corporation can simply be „disarmed“ and go on to produce civilian goods for general prosperity. On the other hand, such an analysis can also point out those weak points where sabotage and attacks are possible in a much more low-threshold way, where there is no need for barbed-wire fences to be climbed, cameras to be tricked and, finally, security personnel to be messed with before even standing on the spacious premises of one of the production sites of organized murder. And yet, other attacks can cause exactly the same impact, namely idle production facilities and/or the destruction of manufactured war materiel before it even reaches one of the battlefields of this world.

When, for example, production lines at MAN, as well as at other vehicle manufacturers, come to a standstill because of a shortage of semiconductors, this shows us how fragile the production of high-tech equipment is, how much it depends not only on certain raw materials but also on a more or less continuously functioning supply chain and the logistics that transport these components to the production sites of the end product. Trucks, tanks, warships, combat aircraft, even far less complex systems such as explosives, rifles and firearms and their ammunition, all require these uninterruptedly functioning supply chains that, additionally, are often not only located all over the country but also depend on international supplies of raw materials and components. And especially in the defense industry, especially in the area of complex systems such as vehicles, where not thousands and thousands of end products are manufactured, but rather a few dozens to hundreds, it may happen that failures of suppliers who deliver a specifically manufactured component that requires a great deal of know-how, or simply special or specifically customized machines, cause the entire production of the end product to collapse over a longer period of time.

Among other goals, the concrete identification of such weak points in the production of weapons and war equipment is a major advantage to a careful analysis of the arms industry. Even if we try in this project to make the entire network of the arms industry in Germany visible, so that everyone may find many more weak points for sabotage and attacks, the following article will focus on the former.

So how can the (local/regional) network of the arms industry be uncovered?

1. A few possible starting points

• Local military forces and police authorities
  It is obvious to start one’s research with the local forces, be they military or police. After all, they use exactly the same equipment and weapons that the defense industry produces for them. So what vehicles do these troops drive? What brand are their radios? Which manufacturers produce their weapons? Such banal questions (about which, in case of doubt, even one of the mercenaries will provide information) will lead to the first companies that are part of the arms industry.
• Arms companies that are already identified
  Another possibility is to start with already identified arms companies, i.e. usually those whose business activity is exclusively the production of weapons and/or war equipment. For this purpose, newspapers, as well as the Internet, can be searched and even such trivial search queries as „arms companies Germany“ will spit out a whole list of such companies.
• Lobbying associations
  This is one of the most fruitful sources for gaining a comprehensive overview of more central players in the arms industry. Even if many companies do not openly advertise that they make part of their profit by slaughtering people elsewhere, they still want politics, both national and international, to represent their interests and ensure both that such slaughter takes place on a regular basis and that they are allowed to supply the butchers of this world with the necessary equipment. To this end, they join together in lobby organizations whose membership lists consequently reveal who all has an interest in a flourishing arms industry. Of course, such lobby organizations do not call themselves „friends of the ongoing slaughter“, but rather give themselves names like „Federal Association of the German Security and Defense Industry e.V. (BDSV)“ or „AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)“, anyway, „defense“ and „security“ are frequent terms used to disguise the slaughter. Sometimes, however, corresponding lobbying associations call themselves more blatantly „German Army  Society e.V.“ or „German Society for Defense Technology e.V. (DWT)“.
• Conferences and trade fairs
  Also good starting points are various conferences and trade fairs where the various friends of carnage from politics, business and the military gather. One example is the internationally important „Munich Security Conference“, but arms fairs and the like also reveal the companies of the arms industry in the form of their participants.

2. Digging deeper

2.1 Internet research

Now that virtually every company presents itself to its customers and the public on the Internet, this sometimes makes it much easier to research supply chains. Although companies – and certainly not defense contractors – do not usually keep lists of their suppliers, smaller companies in particular – but not exclusively – often brag about who they are registered to supply. Under the headings „References“, „Case Studies“, „Customers“ or „Projects“, many companies list on their websites who they supply. Sometimes, especially for „Case Studies“, they even provide detailed information about which product they supply to a company and what it is used for there. Now you are faced with the problem that you know the companies and armed forces whose suppliers you are particularly interested in, but because you don’t know these suppliers you can’t check their website to see whether they supply these companies/armies (and state this). But this is a problem that a search engine can solve. For example, you only need to search for something like „references Rheinmetall“ and it will spit out a whole list of companies that state that they supply Rheinmetall. Of course, the same works for the „Bundeswehr“, the „Federal Criminal Police Office“, the „Federal Police“, the „Federal Office for Information Technology Equipment and Utilization of the Bundeswehr“ and any other defense company. Trivial, isn’t it?

But it gets even more trivial: After all, the entire military-industrial complex also consists to a certain extent of some weapons, aircraft and tank freaks, who of course also want to be entertained and supplied with information, be it about how fast such a jet flies, how far a tank shoots or even where these dangerous toys are manufactured. And this information can be found in all kinds of trade journals and/or corresponding websites, such as FlugRevue (https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/). And then there are still the digital industry books, that the arms enterprises use to try to secure orders or something like that and which sometimes attempt something similar to our project, only with the opposite motivation (https://www.army-technology.com/company-a-z/,https://www.naval-technology.com/company-a-z/,https://www.armscom.net/companies,https://www.armscom.net/world-defense-industry-map). So there is hardly anything left for us to do, except to make use of this information, right?

2.2 Geographical Forays

Once you have identified a few of the major production facilities, located military bases in your area and research facilities that deal specifically with weapons and related issues (aviation, naval, aerospace, as well as most communications technology, etc.) and cooperate with relevant companies, then it is often worthwhile to go there and take a closer look:

• Technology partners often have their locations and branch offices directly at or even on the production site of the defense manufacturers. After all, their advice is often in demand, especially for the more complex systems that are manufactured to customer specifications, and it is much easier to live almost next-door.
• On and around research campuses, there are often those companies with an office or branch that have a special interest in the research being conducted there.
• Logistics service providers and other service companies also have their offices and branches on or near the production sites of the producers they serve. For those service providers that specialize in the defense industry, this is no different and is perhaps even more common; after all, it allows the defense company to better verify that all safety standards are also being met during transportation.
• In general, smaller suppliers, which often result from outsourcing to certain business areas or start-ups, are often located in the immediate vicinity of their major customers.
• In the aviation sector, but also in the marine sector and often in vehicle construction, huge industrial parks have formed over the years, in which a cross-section of an entire industry is often represented, from specialized consulting companies to suppliers and logistics service providers, software companies and manufacturers.

All this can be determined by an on-site visit. Names of companies that are also located there or even the company names on foreign company vehicles in the parking lots can be noted in this way and later researched to determine what kind of companies are involved and whether a connection to the defense company in question is plausible. If nothing clear is determined, but a connection is considered plausible and above all relevant, it is sometimes worthwhile to carry out more detailed research (as suggested/described in step 3).

3. The devil is in the details

With the help of the methods described in steps 1 and 2, it is already possible to identify a large number of those companies that more or less openly admit that they have something to do with the defense industry. But what about those companies that try to hide such connections at all costs, for example because they fear becoming victims of attacks and sabotage, or because they fear negative headlines for their company? Aren’t these companies also of great interest in identifying vulnerabilities in the production and supply chains of the defense industry and its logistics?

So let’s dive a little deeper into the matter.

3.1 Revealing bureaucracy

Many companies prefer not to disclose that they supply armies and/or the manufacturers of weapons and war equipment on their websites, and ideally nowhere else that can be accessed en masse. They also do not join the relevant lobbying associations of the arms industry and are not represented at arms fairs and the like. They are often those companies that supply individual parts for tanks, for example, but whose business is mainly to supply the same or similar parts to the automotive industry or heavy construction equipment manufacturers, for example. Or there are megacorporations in the technology and chemical industries whose solutions and products have become industry standards in certain areas, so to speak, and who naturally also supply the manufacturers of tanks, fighter jets, warships, missiles, satellites and weapons, just as they often take orders from the police, military and intelligence services. But why should they advertise this publicly? They don’t need this kind of publicity because they have direct contacts anyway and/or their customers approach them anyway.

However, what is not described as a service or product of these companies often nevertheless leaves certain bureaucratic traces. After all, the defense industry is an industry that relies heavily on secrecy, whether imposed by military customers or out of self-interest. And suppliers who have access to certain information are often required to implement the appropriate standards of secrecy. In addition, in almost all countries there are extensive government regulations governing the export and so also the transport of armaments. And to ensure that all of this is adhered to throughout the entire production chain, suppliers often already demonstrate appropriate certifications and competencies on their websites, just as producers often keep appropriate forms ready in which such certifications are requested from their suppliers. And that, of course, is revealing:

• Logistics companies that are allowed/able to transport Class 1 hazardous goods (explosive substances) have certainly not sought this approval in vain. And if they then also offer services to transport goods that fall under the War Weapons Control Act or have a permit from the Federal Police [BKA] to transport and/or store prohibited weapons, then any doubt that these must be logistics service providers for the arms industry finally evaporates.
• Companies that emphasize in their job postings that applicants should be willing to undergo a security check ([in Germany:] Ü1, Ü2, Ü3) in accordance with the Security Checking Act (Sicherheitsheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, SÜG) often indicate that these companies accept orders from federal authorities that require special secrecy. These are very often orders from the German armed forces, intelligence services and police authorities.
• Defense companies, as well as their suppliers, often implement certain standards that standardize and certify corresponding company processes. The ISO 9001 standard, for example, originates in the defense industry and can be an indication that a company is active in this industry, but it is now also implemented by companies in other industries. The international standard AS9100 is more specific and certifies companies in the aerospace and defense industry. Companies that implement such standards should at least be suspected of being involved in the defense industry. In addition, there are, for example, the United States Military Standards (MIL-*), which define specific standards for military products and are implemented by corresponding companies. The implementation of such a standard clearly qualifies a company as a defense contractor.

3.2 Getting your hands dirty

The methods described so far work very well for finding out a relative breadth of information about the defense industry and its suppliers & Co. and one is often surprised by the information that can be obtained in this way. Nevertheless, they reach their limits, for example, if one is very specifically interested in a certain company, or even in certain details. At the end of the day, in these cases, one will rarely be able to avoid coming out from behind the screen and making a few visits. If we try to outline a few simpler methods of on-site research in the following section, it is not without the warning to always take care of your anonymity. While much of what is described here may be perfectly legal, or at least not involve serious crimes, if the purpose of this research is to identify weak points for a later attack, then there is always a risk that it will later be possible to trace where the information needed for such an attack came from. And it is not uncommon for video surveillance data from the last few weeks and months to be analyzed for this purpose, in order to identify conspicuous persons who have taken a closer look at a site, and the like.

3.2.1 Visitors

If you want to find out who are the suppliers and customers of a company, which service providers are active within the company, etc., it is obvious to take a closer look at the visitors of this company:

• If it is a larger company headquarters with several buildings on a (usually fenced) site with several entrances, it first makes sense to find out which buildings and especially which site entrances are relevant. Depending on the type of visitor, there are various possibilities:
  • Company representatives, whether customers or suppliers, are usually received in the more representative buildings, and generally enter the site via the main entrance/reception.
  • craftspeople/service personnel/external resident personnel from other companies who visit regularly and are integrated into the company’s operations on site can often use the same entrances as the company’s own personnel, which certainly makes observation more difficult. This is particularly typical for IT personnel deployed on site on a long-term basis, craftspeople entrusted with renovation and repair work, as well as maintenance personnel sent by the manufacturers of machines and the like on a longer-term basis. Security services are also often contracted externally. In the case of very large sites that cannot be easily crossed without obstacles, external as well as internal personnel usually enter the site near their place of work, but if the site is rather manageable, then it often depends on how the personnel travel to the site.
  • Concrete deliveries reach the companies via the supplier entrances. If one is concerned with the logistics companies and/or their freight, then they are usually the appropriate place.
• Often companies also have parking spaces for visitors, which can also be interesting for an analysis of the visitors.
• Especially the representatives of customers and suppliers are usually not uniformed, i.e. they do not wear the name of their company on their clothes and often also not on their vehicles. Of course, this means that it is initially unclear where a visitor comes from. The following options are available:
  • In some cases, documents in vehicles in visitor parking lots that can be seen from the outside provide information about which company a visitor works for (printed letters with directions, parking passes or any company merchandise are often left carelessly and visibly inside the car).
  • The „visitor management“ implemented by companies that have special security interests often requires that visitors (and usually employees as well) carry an appropriate badge with their name and company name in plain sight on the factory premises. If a location can be found from which these badges can be seen/photographed, this can provide the desired insight.
  • Of course, visitors can also be observed after they leave the premises in the hope that they will return to their company headquarters. Apart from the fact that this should remain unnoticed under all circumstances and is therefore very costly, one should consider whether this is worth the effort. Often, representatives do not return directly to their company, but visit other customers or go home after their customer visit, take a lunch break, go to a hotel, etc. In many cases, they also have to travel long distances if their company does not have a local office. Chasing someone for hundreds of miles only to find that they have gone home, etc. is quite frustrating and usually there are easier options.
  • Visitors who leave the site can of course be approached under an invented pretext in an attempt to question them accordingly. However, care should be taken that this happens as far as possible out of the view of any cameras and also remains inconspicuous/uninteresting for the visitors themselves. There is hardly anything worse than an encounter that remains in someone’s memory for a long time.

3.2.2 Employees

If you want to find out more about the internal mechanisms of a company, it can make sense to talk to the employees there. However, depending on how banal the information is (sometimes a „Say, I’ve always wondered, what is this place you’re coming out of?“ is enough), it is often necessary to establish a relationship with the employees that goes beyond a single conversation. The same applies here as when addressing visitors: It can be extremely undesirable if a staff member can remember you later. Nevertheless, here are a few possibilities:

• bars/pubs where employees socialize after work, not only can their conversations about work be overheard from the next table, but it is also possible to make casual contact with them. It’s not unusual for people to go to these places to make contacts, and it’s not unusual for people who once frequented these places to stop showing up at some point – you never hear from them again, and no one has to know that you’re only there with the intention of getting a certain piece of information. And anyway, conversations among (apparently) drunk bar patrons are often indiscreet and strange when viewed sober. In order to find such bars, you can follow groups of employees or even individuals who are leaving the premises, or you can simply take a look at the various bars in the area. In this case, the fact that the employees of these companies often wear appropriate ID cards helps to identify them. What you should take into account in any case is that employees of the production are usually definitely in a different mood than employees of the management / administration and you should take into account certain codes (clothing, language, etc.) depending on who you are targeting.
• Workers organized in trade unions allow themselves to be questioned about them in an almost confidential way, about how this or that is going on within them, and so on. Less interesting are the bureaucracies within the unions, in which above all the union’s own bureaucratic elite gathers. After all, these people more or less also represent the interests of their exploiters, or those who exploit their union members, and have relatively internalized the protection of their companies. Much more interesting is the staff one can get in touch with at union events, demonstrations, etc. In Germany, most employees in the defense industry are probably organized in IG Metall.
• Unions are out (understandably). Especially among those in middle and higher management. Instead of dealing with labor disputes, it’s more in vogue to focus on one’s own career. There may well be institutions that do this directly, but the most inconspicuous way seems to have little to do with career: sports. For some years now, it has been good manners to maintain a sporting resume, which can then be talked about in a lively manner at work. Riding a racing bike, running a marathon (there are plenty of company marathons), or any other sport that is in at the moment. Often there are facilities around the premises of large companies, historically developed from company sports clubs, in which countless employees of these romp around, but which are also open to other people. Boulder gyms, tennis clubs, golf clubs, etc. near these companies are also often frequented by management employees. And sports, like bars and pubs, are also a common place to meet strangers. Excellent conditions, then, for learning one or two details and sometimes even company secrets, whether by listening in on conversations or by making contact with a member of the company.

 3.2.3 Infiltrate

One potentially interesting way to find out more about a company is to be employed there on the premises. The biggest disadvantage here is that if you don’t have an alternative identity, you will be known by name and, thanks to the tax office and the like, the state will also be in possession of the information that you once worked for the company. It is therefore a good idea not to be employed directly by the company in question. Even though the company usually knows one’s personal details even if one works there as a cleaner, the connection is less direct and also lapses at some point, while tax office records are kept for all eternity. The relative expense of this method, as well as its risks, suggest that its use should be well considered and planned, and other methods should be preferred if possible. It should also be clear that this method only makes sense where information of considerable importance is expected in a very concrete way, and in our opinion should not be used at all to find just a few more supplier companies, etc., whose relevance cannot be further determined.

An interesting alternative to infiltrating a company can also be a targeted break-in in which documents and/or storage media are stolen or computer systems are infiltrated. However, both of these are only mentioned here as a possibility and are not discussed in detail.

3.2.4 Logistics

Finally, some questions regarding logistics should be addressed here. Simply knowing the logistics companies that ship war materiel and their logistics centers is not necessarily enough or the last word. Information on when and where arms shipments leave the factory premises of the defense companies is essential to be able to stop them. To do this, it makes sense to know the finer details of the logistics surrounding defense contractors. For example, what route do the trucks and/or trains that roll off the factory site take? Where do the drivers make stops? Where are the containers loaded onto ships/airplanes/trucks? Do the deliveries take the direct route from the company premises to the customers or are the products temporarily stored in logistics centers? Are the products and raw materials needed for production delivered directly by the supplier or by a distributor? Do logistics service providers take care of keeping them in stock in logistics centers and delivering them as needed, or is this warehousing located on the production site? The more these and other details are clarified, the more possibilities for intervention arise. It can make sense to observe trucks and vans (often smaller quantities are involved in the defense industry, for which small vans are sufficient) that roll off the factory premises of the defense companies, or to otherwise track the route they take. In addition, regularities in the delivery and removal of goods are of interest, as are correlations between periods of more intensive delivery and large orders, etc.

***

This article is an introduction which, of course, can only be relatively selective in presenting some methods of researching information on the defense industry. It is intended to serve as an inspiration to all interested parties to develop their own methods of pulling the arms industry out from behind the veil that it surrounds itself with and to expose its vulnerabilities.

So that the clouds of smoke of destruction will soon no longer rise above the battlefields of this world, but above the production sites of this industry of death!

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