It is difficult to judge the current situation in Ukraine from a political point of view. Is the whole thing just the well-known dick comparison, some megalomaniac and war-mongering armies and politicians or will it really come to war? This text leaves such questions aside and devotes itself instead to those questions that make much more sense from our point of view: how can a military conflict, a war, a potential NATO war be sabotaged? It is in the nature of things that this text can at most give a few suggestions and we do not want to present ready-made solutions, but simply put a few ideas into the room.
We publish this text on the Internet because we want to share these thoughts with as many like-minded people as possible, with whom it would be impossible for us to discuss these issues face to face. However, we think that any (strategic) exploration of this debate should not take place on the Internet above all because this merely serves repression but is unlikely to have any added value for those who are also determined to use their creative energy to pursue some of the thoughts raised here.
To some, the information presented here will also hardly be new. After all, most of it is clear and well known. Nevertheless, we think it is worthwhile to recall some details of military logistics that have perhaps been pushed a little into the background in the debates about distant wars.
Oh yes, and just to anticipate one thing: attacking the infrastructure of war in no way means choosing a side, in this case Russia’s. Anyone who has some sense knows that war always affects the population and hardly ever the rulers who start it. As anti-militarists we are against all wars and all actors who want to start them and as anti-authoritarians we strive for nothing less than the complete destruction of all states!
A few months ago we read with some interest the text “Fragments for an Insurgent Struggle Against Militarism and the World That Needs It” in Zündlumpen #083 (available in the English anthology – Part 1). Under the heading “(ii) The Infrastructure of War” it raises some old familiar points, such as that the invading military makes use of roads, rails, bridges, etc., just as mapping of the terrain and (also civilian) communications infrastructure are of great help to the military. What this point somewhat neglects, in our opinion, is the logistics of the supply chains. Although the sabotage of arms production is eagerly discussed beforehand, probably the most important raw material of the war is more or less left out: oil or energy in general. Especially at the beginning of a war, the amount of energy needed to move troops is gigantic, but basically, throughout the war, fuel has to be transported from some stockpile and/or refinery to the front, where it is needed to fuel the engines of the war machines. And especially when a war does not take place directly in one’s own territory, but the logistics of supplying the troops with energy run through this territory, it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at this infrastructure.
Where currently, according to media reports as well as various observations from the population, troops are being put on standby everywhere in Europe and war equipment is more or less already being diligently moved to strategically favorable locations, it is of course also to be expected that the transport of oil reserves to the respective regions is already in full swing. Therefore, there seems to us to be no reason to wait for a possible outbreak of war, but all the considerations made in the following could already have a great effect now, in the run-up to a possible military confrontation. And of course, just at this moment, the transfer of war equipment can be sabotaged in advance in one way or another.
NATO pipeline system
For the purpose of supplying its troops within some European alliance countries, NATO operates a pipeline system consisting of 10 pipeline networks. This basically connects militarily used/usable ports with various (partly secret, partly civilian) oil storage sites (tank farms) throughout Europe, as well as with cargo stations, (civilian and military) airports and certain troop locations. In Germany, two of these pipeline networks are of particular importance: the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), which extends through parts of Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and connects 29 NATO depots, six non-military depots, military and civilian airports, refineries, and seaports in the North Sea region over a route length of 5300 kilometers, and the North European Pipeline System (NEPS), which basically connects Frederikshavn in Denmark with the German border.
Incidentally, in the mid-1980s, numerous groups of the RZ, RAF and others carried out explosive attacks on mainly CEPS pumping stations.
The CEPS is also used primarily for civilian purposes, but in the event of a military operation, the military is guaranteed the necessary capacities. Thanks to various civilian actors, however, there are better insights into the infrastructure in some cases. As of 2018, the following CEPS facilities are still in operation on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany:
14 tank depots
22 high-pressure pumps
1765 kilometers of underground pipelines, the course of which can be researched/estimated using the typical above-ground survey points, as well as pumping stations and gated shafts associated with them
11 tank filling plants
2 rail tank car filling plants
Rail networks
Some tank depots are not accessible by pipelines or at least additionally also by rail. In general, the European rail networks provide NATO military forces with a good infrastructure for moving large quantities of fuel and/or war materiel quickly and efficiently. However, the whole thing can also be paralyzed with corresponding ease. Whether by blocking the tracks, small inconspicuous and temporary sabotages, as recently implemented and proposed in Canada, or by destroying rails by force, interrupting power supply (though there are also diesel locomotives) and destroying important signal infrastructure.
Track facilities are actually generally marked on all available map material. Of particular interest in this case may be not only the busy main lines, but especially those lines that serve tank depots, as well as those that cross the country’s borders towards Ukraine, but also the connecting lines to ports and/or tank filling plants, where transport can be transferred from the rails to the roads.
The TRAINSTOPPING brochure may provide further ideas here.
Roads & Ports
Of course, roads and ports can also be blocked. Here, however, it might be advantageous to find out beforehand very specifically when and where corresponding military supplies are also blocked, because such blockades are usually not of long duration. For those who prefer to engage in civil disobedience rather than attack under cover of darkness, however, this might be a more interesting starting point.
The possible war in Ukraine, it starts here and now. Let’s stop it together here and now!
